" The Pentagon says it really is preparing to figure out the way the Army Special Forces mission in Niger unfolded last collapse and led to your grisly ambush by which four soldiers expired".
A report summary released Thursday includes recommendations to improve mission planning and approval procedures, re-evaluate equipment and weapons requirements, and review training that USA commandos conduct with partner forces.
"I take ownership for all the events connected to the ambush of 4 October".
Waldhauser said that as a result of the investigation, Africom has already made changes to make U.S troops in western Africa safer.
The U.S. has some 20 military missions in Africa, mostly in the northern half of the continent.
The video describes how the convoy was forced to split up and how it was outflanked by over 100 enemy fighters.
Amid the chaos, he says, there were repeated acts of bravery as the outnumbered and outgunned soldiers made split-second decisions under heavy fire, struggling to protect and rescue each other during the more than hourlong assault.
But at the time of their deployment, only half of the United States team had conducted any collective training together, according to an eight-page summary of findings of the investigation, which itself remains classified.
The report summary includes recommendations to improve mission planning and approval procedures, re-evaluate equipment and weapons requirements, and review training that US commandos conduct with partner forces. And the report found there was a lack of attention to detail and lax communication about missions that led to a "general lack of situational awareness and command oversight at every echelon".
"All four soldiers killed in action sustained wounds that were either immediately fatal or rapidly fatal", the summary of the report said.
The Americans left their base a day earlier, October 3, on a routine mission to check in with village elders.
Who should have approved the mission, and at what level?
Risky climate pressured the helicopters to abort, Wright mentioned, and his son's staff went on to the positioning, the place they destroyed bikes, ammunition and different gear earlier than heading to Tongo Tongo.
As the team left Tiloa, bound for their base in Ouallam, the Lt. Colonel in Chad ordered them to participate in a second kill-or-capture mission targeting the same ISIS leader at a location farther north.
Soon after leaving Tongo Tongo, about 120 miles (200 kilometers) north of Niamey, Niger's capital, they were ambushed by Islamic State-linked militants carrying small arms and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. They stopped in Tongo Tongo to get water and meet with village leaders. The investigation found there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the villagers were complicit in the ambush.
Killed in the attack were: Army Sgt. La David T. Johnson, 25, of Miami Gardens, Florida; Workers Sgt. Bryan C. Black, 35, of Puyallup, Washington; Workers Sgt. Jeremiah W. Johnson, 39, of Springboro, Ohio; and Workers Sgt. Dustin M. Wright, 29, of Lyons, Georgia.
The force of almost 120 ISIS fighters was the largest ever encountered by USA troops in Niger.
"Sgt. La David Johnson, first of all, died actively engaging the enemy", Cloutier said.
While the US troops in western Africa may be conducting fewer missions as a result, they have also been "beefed up" with increased firepower and drone surveillance, the option to use armored vehicles and additional response teams.
Families of the fallen have expressed frustration with the incident and the briefings they got. He said he's concerned the Army may be pinning blame on lower-ranking soldiers and not accepting responsibility high enough up the chain of command.
Several officials said that two junior officers had initially sought to carry out a high value target mission that they did not have authorization to conduct but the team was redirected to a lower risk mission more in line with their authorized mission.